BATTLE OF TURIN 1706 - FRENCH REGIMENT DAMAS

The regiment was raised on 25 July 1702 by Jean-Jacques, Chevalier de Damas, who remained its colonel until 10 July 1708. He was then succeeded by Joseph-Guillaume Boutin, Comte de Vallouze, who commanded the unit until 30 July 1715. On that date, the regiment ceased to exist as an independent formation and was incorporated into the Royal Vaisseaux Infanterie.

During the War of the Spanish Succession, the regiment was employed in several different theatres of operations. In 1704, it served in the campaign in Savoy, while in the following year it took part in the conquest of the County of Nice. In 1706, it participated in the siege of Turin and, on 7 September, fought in the disastrous battle that ended the Bourbon siege of the city.

After the defeat at Turin, the regiment was transferred in 1707 to the frontier of Navarre. In 1708, it campaigned in Aragon and took part in the sieges of Lérida and Tortosa. In 1710, it served with the Army of Dauphiné, before being transferred to the Army of Catalonia in 1711. Its final major operation of the war came in 1714, when it participated in the siege and capture of Barcelona. 

During the siege of Turin, this unit was deployed in the sector between the Dora and the Po and employed in siege operations. One particularly interesting aspect concerning the regiment is the identification of the uniform it wore.

The regiment had been raised by one of the most prominent families of the French nobility, and the drummers’ livery therefore followed the traditional colours of that family. Although the coat itself can be identified, as usual, as greyish white, determining the colour of the cuffs proved more difficult.

As often happens, useful evidence is provided partly by the family coat of arms and partly by the ordonnance flag, in both of which blue is the predominant colour. The most important clue, however, is fortunately supplied by the fact that, during the French Revolutionary Wars, the same family raised a unit known as the Légion de Damas. From its uniform, it is possible to infer that the cuffs were not black, as shown in the surviving gouaches, but dark blue, as represented in our template.

We have several surviving representations of this unit in which the blue appears extremely dark, almost black—a shade that would not be appropriate for the War of the Spanish Succession. In this particularly careful illustration, however, it is evident that the colour is in fact a very deep blue, which can easily appear black in older sketches.

Hussar Damas

 

(NB: the azure uniforms of these units came as a sort of standard of the Emigrés troops)

Drapeau d'Ordonnance

Drapeau Colonel

Regiment Damas - Drummer first version

Regiment Damas - Drummer. Correct Livery

The modification of this drummer was based on a statistical study that I carried out. Apart from the royal and provincial regiments, whose drummers all wore the royal livery, the other regiments generally used the livery of the family that owned the regiment. While examples survive for many of these units, references are lacking for others, such as the Damas Regiment.

It should be remembered that the House of Damas was both powerful and wealthy and would therefore have had no difficulty providing the drummers of the regiment bearing its name with rich and elaborate liveries. I nevertheless carried out a comparative and statistical analysis and found that the colours of the livery almost always corresponded to those of the regimental flag. The basic principle was that the noble colours, silver and gold, were generally reserved for decorative elements. An exception arose in cases such as this one, since the use of a blue livery would have been considered an unthinkable offence, blue being a royal prerogative.

The drummer’s livery for this regiment has therefore been reconstructed by taking the colours of its flag as the starting point.

BATTLE OF TURIN 1706 - FRENCH REGIMENT BOURBON

This regiment came to my attention entirely by chance. In fact, it does not appear at all in the order of battle in my possession, nor in the lists of regiments that took part in the Battle of Turin and, above all, in the siege of Turin in 1706. How, then, did I manage to identify it?

The answer lies in the fact that I am currently trying to reconstruct the uniforms of all the French regiments stationed in the salient between the Dora and the Po: precisely those units that were directly involved in the siege operations, but did not take a direct part in the Battle of Turin itself. In the list of regiments deployed on that front, while a was making my researches, I found that this Regiment partecipated to the Battle of Turin. I began then by checking the Bourbon Regiment and immediately found, in every source, that it had taken part in the siege of Turin. 

On 30 December 1698, the regiment incorporated the disbanded La Mothe Infanterie, which had originally been raised in 1695. At the beginning of the War of the Spanish Succession, it consisted of a single battalion, but on 1 February 1701 it was expanded to two.

The regiment had been commanded since 4 November 1690 by Guillaume-Alexandre, Marquis de Vieuxpont. On 26 October 1704, the colonelcy passed to N., Comte de Vieuxpont, and in 1705 to Guy-Claude Roland, Comte de Montmorency-Laval, who retained command until 6 March 1719.

In 1701, the first battalion campaigned in Flanders, brigaded with Picardie Infanterie. By July it had joined Rosen’s army, and in October it was encamped at Argenteau before taking up winter quarters at Liège. At the beginning of 1702 it was still attached to the Army of Flanders, but at the end of April it was transferred to the Army of the Rhine under Maréchal de Catinat. By June, it was deployed in the second line of the infantry centre as part of De Vieux-Pont’s Brigade.

The second battalion, meanwhile, formed part of the garrison of Landau. From June to September 1702, it participated in the defence of the fortress. When Landau finally surrendered on 10 September, the garrison was permitted to march out with the honours of war, colours flying and drums beating. Two days later, the fortress was formally handed over to the Margrave of Baden, while the French garrison was escorted towards Billigheim and Weissenburg.

In 1703, the first battalion served under Maréchal de Villars. It took part in the Siege of Kehl during February and March, then accompanied Villars into Bavaria, participating in the combats of Hornberg and Munderkirchen. On 20 September, it fought at the Battle of Höchstädt and afterwards occupied Ulm and Augsburg.

On 13 August 1704, while serving under Marsin, the first battalion fought at the Battle of Blenheim. During the action, Grenadier Captain de Ricousse was struck by a musket ball that passed through his body. After the collapse of the Franco-Bavarian army, the battalion withdrew to Alsace and undertook garrison duties at Schlestadt and later at Kehl, where it was rejoined by the second battalion.

On 3 July 1705, the reunited regiment took part in the attack on the Lines of Weissembourg. It was then sent towards Dauphiné and later contributed to the capture of Soncino and Montmélian. In December, it played an active role in the Siege of Nice. During the siege, the Colonel-Lieutenant, Comte de Montmorency-Laval, was severely wounded by a cannonball that passed between his body and one of his arms. He survived the injury and would eventually be promoted to Maréchal de France in 1747.

After Nice capitulated on 4 January 1706, the regiment marched into Piedmont. On 7 September, it fought at the Battle of Turin, which ended in a disastrous defeat for the Franco-Spanish army. Following the battle, the regiment withdrew to France.

In 1707, it helped relieve Toulon before being transferred once again to the Army of the Rhine. In July 1708, after the defeat at Oudenarde, the regiment was sent from Germany to reinforce the Army of Flanders. During the Siege of Lille, from August to December, it formed part of the troops assembled at the camp of Meldert under the Marquis d’Hautefort.

In 1709, the regiment took part in the defence of Tournai, where it stubbornly held the hornwork of Sept-Fontaines for eighteen days. On 18 July, its major was killed by shell splinters, while another fragment crushed the left hand of the colonel. Later that year, on 11 September, the regiment fought in the bloody Battle of Malplaquet, during which Captain de La Brunie was wounded.

The regiment remained in Flanders in 1710. In 1711, it distinguished itself in the attack on Fort Arleux, where it captured a considerable number of prisoners, before taking up garrison duty at Valenciennes.

On 10 July 1712, the regiment made a sortie from Valenciennes against an Allied foraging force that had occupied the village of Beuvrage. Around 3,000 Allied soldiers had entrenched themselves in the gardens and cemetery, but they were driven out and 250 prisoners were taken. After the French victory at Denain, the regiment participated in the Siege of Marchiennes, the Siege of Douai, where it stormed the gorge of a demi-lune, and the siege and capture of Le Quesnoy, where it later remained in garrison.

In 1713, the regiment was transferred to the Army of the Rhine. It took part in the submission of Speyer, Worms and Kaiserslautern, and later served at the Siege of Landau, where it stormed the position known as the “Pâté” and captured the counterguard protecting one of the bastions. On 20 September, it participated in the victory over General Vaubonne before taking part in the Siege of Freiburg.

Drapeau d'Ordonnance

BATTLE OF TURIN 1706 - FRENCH REGIMENT MONTMORENCY

 This was a little-known French regiment, whose history may be summarised as follows. It was raised on 25 July 1702 by Michel-Camus Destouches. During the War of the Spanish Succession, it was commanded first by Destouches himself, then, from 19 November 1702, by François, Marquis de Montmorency-La Neuville, and finally (because the former commander passed to command the Bresse Regiment on that very same day), from 10 October 1706 until 30 July 1715,  by Jean-Claude de Masselin. On 30 July 1715, the regiment was incorporated into Tallard Infanterie.

In 1703, the regiment was sent to Italy. From October 1704 to April 1705, it took part in the siege and capture of Verrua. In 1706, it participated in the siege of Turin, woth 1 battallion remaining in the sector between the Dora and the Po, within the main siege area, but without undertaking any particularly significant action. It appears to have been one of the less distinguished regiments, employed mainly in surveillance duties and in holding and guarding the siege positions, rather than in offensive operations or direct assaults.

In 1707, the regiment took part in the defence of Toulon. From 1708 to 1713, it served with the Army of Dauphiné, and in 1714 it participated in the siege and capture of Barcelona.

Coat of Arm of Montmorency La Neuville

The coat of arms makes it easy to identify the drummers’ livery: red with yellow and blue decorations.

Drapeau d'Ordonnance 

Drapeau Colonel

SIEGE OF TURIN 1706 - THE HILL DEFENCES

 One of the least studied aspects of the 1706 Siege of Turin concerns the hilltop defences established to protect Monte dei Cappuccini, a small hill—still clearly visible today—which overlooks the River Po below and controlled access to the city from the riverside.

Yet, from the perspective of historical and archaeological research, this is precisely the area that may offer the greatest rewards. The natural configuration of the terrain has inevitably remained largely unchanged, and several sections of the original defensive works still survive, although they are now concealed and difficult to identify.

This research has also led me to discover and appreciate a part of my own city, close to where I live, which I had nevertheless never previously explored.

Therefore began with the most precise and least stylised map available for reconstructing the hilltop defences: Alessandro Luigi Emanuelle’s 1708 Plan of the City and Citadel of Turin, produced only two years after the siege. Although this map naturally contains a number of inconsistencies, it nevertheless provides the best surviving representation of the defensive works on the hills.

From this map, I was able to reconstruct my own version, reproduced here, as well as to identify the names of the original farmsteads in the area.

1) Fort of Villa Genero

2) Monte dei Capuccini

3) Borgo di Po

4) Vigna della Marchesa (today: Villa della Regina)

5) Today: Via Villa della Regina

6) Val Salice

However, after producing this first map, I attempted to transpose it onto a modern map of Turin. In fact, the satellite view made it possible, to some extent, to refine the actual layout of the fortifications, as shown in the map below.

This is the first map ever produced that makes it possible to see today what existed here 320 years ago.

 here with the numbers is red in order to understand the map above.

However, my research eventually led me to go out “into the field” in search of physical evidence. I therefore visited Villa Genero, now a beautiful public park that I had never previously taken into consideration. I climbed to the top, where I found what is still known today as the Fortino, although it is in very poor condition. I would very much like to see it restored and returned to its former splendour.

Over time, this small fort was altered and transformed into a kind of Art Nouveau-style pavilion between the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when this part of the hill belonged to the Genero family. Nevertheless, a careful examination of the structure reveals that its lower brick-built section is likely to preserve the remains of the original fortification situated on the summit of this part of the hill. It served as a defensive strongpoint and as an observation post from which operations across the hills could be monitored and controlled. (number 1 in the maps)

It is a forgotten piece of the city’s history, and one that was entirely unknown to me.

In the past, it was impossible to discern its original appearance, as the walls had been covered with a rough coat of render by the owner.

The sadly neglected state in which the Fortino stands today makes it seem almost as though the City has no wish to honour the heroic defence mounted on this part of the defensive salient as well.

From an aerial view, and after carrying out a series of on-site measurements—rather risky, given some of the people who frequent the park today—I was able to determine the perimeter of the Fortino, despite the dense vegetation.

These photographs show the northern side of the Fortino, which is remarkably well preserved. The relevant section is marked with an X in the aerial photograph.

The Fort (later called) Genero

While the fort itself had a kind of defensive bastion, the remainder of the defensive salient consisted of a dry-stone wall with a step in front of it. The wall was approximately 1.20 metres high on the inside and around 2.80 metres high on the outside.

It must, of course, be assumed that there was no vegetation around it, since one of the fundamental principles of siege warfare was to maintain a clear and unobstructed field of fire, as can be seen, for example, in the final photograph taken from the eastern side of Fortino Genero.

External part of the perimetral defensive wall (North-side) - letter Z

External side of the Fort bastion - North side - Letter Y

Internal wall - Letter K

Profile view of the defensive walls of Fort “Genero”.

It should not be forgotten that the siege plans drawn up by the celebrated Vauban for the siege of Turin envisaged an attack developing from the hilly sector, rather than a direct assault on the Citadel, as La Feuillade ultimately chose to do, at an enormous cost in both resources and human lives.

Indeed, once the hilltop defensive salient had been breached—either through Fortino Genero or, above all, through the flanking sectors protected by simpler defensive structures—it would have been possible to bombard the Monte dei Cappuccini area and the defensive bastions of Borgo di Po, now Piazza Gran Madre di Dio, with cannon and mortar fire. The defenders would have been unable to return fire effectively, since they would have had to shoot uphill. Once the bastions of Borgo di Po—and, above all, Monte dei Cappuccini—had been occupied, the besiegers could have used the same tactical advantage to fire directly upon the eastern defences of the city, which were difficult to garrison effectively. This would have rapidly weakened that defensive sector and rendered the Citadel virtually useless from a defensive standpoint.

Vauban's supposed siege plan

1) Lines of attack East Side (against the Fort Genero)

2) Lines of Attack South Side (through Val Salice)

3) Lines of attack North Side 

4) Minor Lines to direct attack on the Monte dei Capuccini's defenses. 

Once the lines had been breached at points 1, 2 and 3, the troops and artillery could readily have taken up position at point 5, marked in red—today Via Villa della Regina—a small valley overlooking Borgo di Po. From there, they could have subjected it to artillery fire at extremely close range, firing downhill.

In these two images, one can still see traces of the bastions facing Monte dei Cappuccini—and to think that I pass them every morning, since my children’s school is on that very road. Their original line seems to have been retained as a guide when the road was later constructed. The area concerned is the one circled in red.

BATTLE OF TURIN 1706. FRENCH REGIMENT LA REINE

The uniform also included a blue waistcoat with pewter buttons and white woollen buttonholes. These details cannot be seen in this illustration, just as they would normally have remained concealed on the battlefield, where the soldier’s coat was kept closed and prevented the waistcoat underneath from being visible.

                                

                                          REGIMENT LA REINE

During the War of the Spanish Succession, the regiment was successively commanded by Louis d’Ornaison, Comte de Chamarande, from 20 March 1693; N. d’Ornaison, Marquis de Buzançois, from 29 January 1702; Louis-Pierre-Maximilien de Sully, Duc de Béthune, from 27 October 1706; and Daniel-François de Gelas de Voisins de Lautrec, Chevalier d’Ambres, from 28 April 1711 until 21 August 1734. When the regiment returned to France in 1715, it absorbed the surviving men of the disbanded Eppeville Infanterie.

In mid-February 1701, the regiment’s three battalions were sent to the Spanish Netherlands, where they occupied Luxembourg in the name of Philip V, the new king of Spain. By 20 July, the regiment had joined the army commanded by the Maréchal de Villeroy. In October it was stationed in Upper Gelderland, and by December its battalions were quartered at Roermond, Weert and Stockem.

On 8 June 1702, the regiment left these positions and marched to join the Army of Germany. In September it departed from Strasbourg with Villars and advanced towards Huningue. On 14 October, it fought at the Battle of Friedlingen, where its brigade formed part of the first line alongside the Champagne and Bourbonnais brigades. After the battle, the regiment took up its winter quarters at Bitche and Homburg.

In February and March 1703, the regiment participated in the siege and capture of Kehl. On 4 March, it took part in the assault on the covered way of the hornwork, during which Captain Lescarmoussier and Lieutenant Chevalier were killed. The regiment subsequently contributed to the attack on the Lines of Stollhofen and followed Villars through the Black Forest into Bavaria. During this advance it fought in the Hornberg Valley and at Munderkirchen. On 20 September, it distinguished itself in the victorious Battle of Höchstädt, after which it took part in the occupation of Kempten, Augsburg and Ulm.

In 1704, the regiment served with Marsin’s Corps in Bavaria. On 13 August, it was engaged in the disastrous Battle of Blenheim. Following the defeat, it withdrew towards the Rhine and spent the winter at Strasbourg. Earlier that year, a detachment had also been sent to defend the Alpine passes in Provence. In June, the company commanded by Captain de Lème held the Castle of Cuébris for seven days .

In 1705, the regiment initially served on the Moselle under Villars. On 17 August, it left the region and began the march towards Italy.

The following year, the regiment took part in the siege of Turin. On 22 June 1706, its grenadiers successfully repelled a sortie by the defenders. On 16 July, however, its colonel, the Marquis de Buzançois, was killed in action. After the disastrous conclusion of the siege, the regiment withdrew from Italy and returned to France. Its 779 surviving officers and men subsequently rejoined Villars in Alsace.

Considering that the regiment was present at Turin with three battalions, amounting to approximately 1,500–1,800 men, the fact that it returned after the defeat with only 779 soldiers—roughly half of its original strength—clearly shows how heavily it had been employed during the siege and how severe its losses must have been.

The fact that its grenadiers repelled a sortie on 16 June, and that its colonel was killed in action on 16 July, suggests that the unit remained continuously engaged in the front line for at least a month, and possibly longer. It was therefore most likely deployed in an advanced position, as indicated in the image.

Details:

In 1707, the regiment participated in the various operations conducted by Villars. It took part in the capture of the Lines of Stollhofen and in the occupation of Ettlingen, Pforzheim, Winhing and Schorndorf.

In 1708, the regiment was transferred to the Army of Flanders. On 11 July, it fought at the Battle of Oudenarde. During the subsequent siege of Lille, it remained in the camp at Meldert under the command of the Marquis d’Hautefort.

In 1709, the regiment served under the Comte d’Albergotti. On 11 September, it fought with great determination at the Battle of Malplaquet. It took part in Villars’ celebrated charge against the British troops holding the Sart Woods. During this action Villars was wounded in the knee, while the regiment’s colonel was also wounded.

The regiment continued to serve in Flanders throughout 1710 and 1711.

In 1712, after the French victory at Denain on 24 July, the regiment’s brigade was among the six brigades sent under the Maréchal de Montesquiou to seize Marchiennes. The regiment also distinguished itself in the capture of the Fort de Scarpe during the siege of Douai and later participated in the siege of Le Quesnoy.

In 1713, the regiment joined the Army of the Rhine. It took part in the siege and recapture of Landau, in the defeat of General Vaubonne near Freiburg and in the subsequent siege of Freiburg itself. On 2 October, a force of 400 defenders launched a sortie against the left of the French trenches. The regiment quickly took position along the line and delivered a devastating volley, bringing the attack to a halt. When the defenders rallied and renewed their advance, a second volley fired at point-blank range forced them to retreat rapidly towards the covered way.

In 1714, the regiment was sent to Spain, where the Catalans still refused to lay down their arms. It took part in the siege of Barcelona and, on 11 September, formed the head of one of the four assault columns that stormed the city.

 

Drapeau d'Ordonnance

Drapeau d'Ordonnance

Drapeau Colonel

SIEGE OF TURIN 1706 - THE SUPPLY LINES

It is often striking how wars of the modern age are analysed not only from a purely tactical perspective but also from a logistical one, whereas for earlier conflicts this latter aspect is frequently overlooked. And yet, in order to undertake a siege on the scale of that of the capital of the Duchy of Savoy — Turin — it was necessary to assess in advance what quantities and types of material would be required.

This therefore helps to clarify the French need to capture the Fort of Bard, on the first Alpine line, as well as Montmélian in Savoy, and then Verrua and Crescentino, in order to open the main supply route along the Po. These were military efforts that were costly in every respect, but which had become necessary.

This is the very first map to bring together this information and to attempt to clarify this complex network of supply lines.

There were as many as four supply lines: two crossed the Alps, another was a river route bringing supplies from the Duchy of Milan, and yet another came by sea from Genoa; the latter two converged at Casale, the eastern logistical hub of the siege.

THE ALPS ROUTES N. 1 AND N. 2

The Army of Piedmont had received reinforcements between 19 January and 4 May 1706. The French troops had crossed the Little St Bernard Pass and had entered Piedmont through the Aosta Valley, using Ivrea as a gathering point. (see black line in the map) During this period, 17.307 infantrymen and 4.254 cavalrymen had passed through on their way towards Turin. The Aosta Valley was not as troubled as the Piedmontese countryside, and there were good logistical bases both at Aosta and at Ivrea. The main drawback of this route was that it required a very long detour through Savoy; the speed of communications was sacrificed to the security of movements. It was no coincidence that this was the preferred route in the spring, when the campaign had not yet begun.

Another road that could be used was the Val di Susa route (second black line). This had one undeniable advantage: it was the shortest way. After Chiomonte (stiil in France), one entered occupied territory: sixty rather dangerous kilometres to be crossed, watched over by the fort of Santa Maria di Susa and by the garrison of Avigliana (held by some Militia troops from Monferrato). The stretch between the lower valley and the trenches of Turin was, for the French troops, absolutely one of the most dangerous places in the Duchy, owing to the presence of partisan bands and detachments of Allied cavalry.

The large convoys descending from the Val di Susa were often subjected to attacks and ambushes, with the loss of their precious cargoes. These consisted mainly of supplies of food and forage and, at times, gunpowder. The convoys could be truly imposing in size: the one that reached La Feuillade on 10 May 1706 numbered something like 3,000 mules, and was obviously placed under very close escort. 

LEGENDA

THE PO ROUTE

The privileged route remained the course of the Po. The Duke of Vendôme and La Feuillade had fought in 1704 and 1705 for control of the river as far as Turin. Strongholds such as Verrua and Chivasso had been defended with extreme determination by the Allies, in order to prevent the troops of the Two Crowns from gaining control of the river. 

The boats travelling upstream were, in practical terms, virtually unassailable by the forces of the Ducal partisans. The draught animals needed to overcome the current were escorted by entire regiments. By exploiting river navigation, the heavy siege artillery, tons of ammunition, cannonballs, grenades and powder reached the camp at Turin with minimal effort in relation to the tonnage of goods transported, and with a negligible rate of loss in terms of men and material.

At the same time, it was possible to transfer to Chivasso and Casale the thousands of wounded men lying in the hospitals. After the fall of Verrua in April 1705, the Allies were no longer able to dispute French control of the river waters. The French were thus able to establish two logistical centres at Chivasso and Crescentino, intended to support the movement of materials and various supplies arriving from the Duchy of Milan.

At this point Casale became the true pivot around which the entire logistical machine of the French army operating in Piedmont was built. The city, defended by its castle and by a modest circuit of walls, partly bastioned — works more than sufficient to keep away any Allied raids — was garrisoned by the battalion of the Monferrato infantry regiment Natta.

To Casale arrived also huge quantitied of matirial transported from the Milanese. Washed by the waters of the Po, the capital of the Duchy received boats coming both from the Alessandria area and from Lombardy, above all Pavia, the main fluvial port of the Milanese where supplies were gathered. From there, convoys were organised which had to ascend the river as far as Turin.

This system also allowed the French to make a considerable saving in forces. They did not have enough troops to control the entire network of land communications which extended towards west, through the hills of Monferrato.

                    

                                                               THE MARITIME ROUTE

The warehouses of Casale also received materials unloaded at Genoa and coming from Toulon and Marseilles. This maritime route brought supplies through the accommodating port of Genoa, then overland to the river port of Valenza, and from there towards Casale, the eastern logistical hub of the entire besieging force.

                                           THE TWO HYPOTHETICAL NEW SUPPLY ROUTES

Alongside these lines of communication, La Feuillade planned two further and different supply routes: one across the Alps, through the Col Agnel and then towards Saluzzo — a shorter but highly dangerous route, given the large number of partisan forces and militia, as well as regular troops, which would have made the actual delivery of supplies extremely difficult; the other, longer route was by sea, using the more convenient and nearby ports of Savona and Finale Ligure.

Once the goods had been unloaded, however, it was necessary to establish a secure route through southern Piedmont, by capturing the towns of Ceva and Mondovì, which were expected to fall easily into French hands. Yet the stubborn resistance of these two strongholds prevented the opening of a further, second maritime supply route.

Here I add an extended map, showing the supply lines from Pavia and Milan. It is in fact important to have an idea of how materials set out from the interior of the very rich Duchy of Milan towards Turin. Perhaps this is why, even today, Juventus and Inter still cannot stand each other?