It is often striking how wars of the modern age are analysed not only from a purely tactical perspective but also from a logistical one, whereas for earlier conflicts this latter aspect is frequently overlooked. And yet, in order to undertake a siege on the scale of that of the capital of the Duchy of Savoy — Turin — it was necessary to assess in advance what quantities and types of material would be required.
This therefore helps to clarify the French need to capture the Fort of Bard, on the first Alpine line, as well as Montmélian in Savoy, and then Verrua and Crescentino, in order to open the main supply route along the Po. These were military efforts that were costly in every respect, but which had become necessary.
This is the very first map to bring together this information and to attempt to clarify this complex network of supply lines.
THE ALPS ROUTES N. 1 AND N. 2
The Army of Piedmont had received reinforcements between 19 January and 4 May 1706. The French troops had crossed the Little St Bernard Pass and had entered Piedmont through the Aosta Valley, using Ivrea as a gathering point. (see black line in the map) During this period, 17.307 infantrymen and 4.254 cavalrymen had passed through on their way towards Turin. The Aosta Valley was not as troubled as the Piedmontese countryside, and there were good logistical bases both at Aosta and at Ivrea. The main drawback of this route was that it required a very long detour through Savoy; the speed of communications was sacrificed to the security of movements. It was no coincidence that this was the preferred route in the spring, when the campaign had not yet begun.
Another road that could be used was the Val di Susa route (second black line). This had one undeniable advantage: it was the shortest way. After Chiomonte (stiil in France), one entered occupied territory: sixty rather dangerous kilometres to be crossed, watched over by the fort of Santa Maria di Susa and by the garrison of Avigliana (held by some Militia troops from Monferrato). The stretch between the lower valley and the trenches of Turin was, for the French troops, absolutely one of the most dangerous places in the Duchy, owing to the presence of partisan bands and detachments of Allied cavalry.
The large convoys descending from the Val di Susa were often subjected to attacks and ambushes, with the loss of their precious cargoes. These consisted mainly of supplies of food and forage and, at times, gunpowder. The convoys could be truly imposing in size: the one that reached La Feuillade on 10 May 1706 numbered something like 3,000 mules, and was obviously placed under very close escort.
LEGENDA
THE PO ROUTE
The privileged route remained the course of the Po. The Duke of Vendôme and La Feuillade had fought in 1704 and 1705 for control of the river as far as Turin. Strongholds such as Verrua and Chivasso had been defended with extreme determination by the Allies, in order to prevent the troops of the Two Crowns from gaining control of the river.
The boats travelling upstream were, in practical terms, virtually unassailable by the forces of the Ducal partisans. The draught animals needed to overcome the current were escorted by entire regiments. By exploiting river navigation, the heavy siege artillery, tons of ammunition, cannonballs, grenades and powder reached the camp at Turin with minimal effort in relation to the tonnage of goods transported, and with a negligible rate of loss in terms of men and material.
At the same time, it was possible to transfer to Chivasso and Casale the thousands of wounded men lying in the hospitals. After the fall of Verrua in April 1705, the Allies were no longer able to dispute French control of the river waters. The French were thus able to establish two logistical centres at Chivasso and Crescentino, intended to support the movement of materials and various supplies arriving from the Duchy of Milan.
At this point Casale became the true pivot around which the entire logistical machine of the French army operating in Piedmont was built. The city, defended by its castle and by a modest circuit of walls, partly bastioned — works more than sufficient to keep away any Allied raids — was garrisoned by the battalion of the Monferrato infantry regiment Natta.
To Casale arrived also huge quantitied of matirial transported from the Milanese. Washed by the waters of the Po, the capital of the Duchy received boats coming both from the Alessandria area and from Lombardy, above all Pavia, the main fluvial port of the Milanese where supplies were gathered. From there, convoys were organised which had to ascend the river as far as Turin.
This system also allowed the French to make a considerable saving in forces. They did not have enough troops to control the entire network of land communications which extended towards west, through the hills of Monferrato.
THE MARITIME ROUTE
The warehouses of Casale also received materials unloaded at Genoa and coming from Toulon and Marseilles. This maritime route brought supplies through the accommodating port of Genoa, then overland to the river port of Valenza, and from there towards Casale, the eastern logistical hub of the entire besieging force.
THE TWO HYPOTHETICAL NEW SUPPLY ROUTES
Alongside these lines of communication, La Feuillade planned two further and different supply routes: one across the Alps, through the Col Agnel and then towards Saluzzo — a shorter but highly dangerous route, given the large number of partisan forces and militia, as well as regular troops, which would have made the actual delivery of supplies extremely difficult; the other, longer route was by sea, using the more convenient and nearby ports of Savona and Finale Ligure.
Once the goods had been unloaded, however, it was necessary to establish a secure route through southern Piedmont, by capturing the towns of Ceva and Mondovì, which were expected to fall easily into French hands. Yet the stubborn resistance of these two strongholds prevented the opening of a further, second maritime supply route.
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